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Abstract 
Using a rich dataset of high frequency historical information from 2004 to 2013 we 
study the determinants of European sovereign bond returns over calm and crisis periods. 
We find that the sign of the equity beta crucially depends on country risk. In low risk 
countries, government bonds represent a natural hedge against equity risk as the equity 
beta is negative regardless of market conditions. On the other hand, government bonds of 
high risk countries lose their “safe-asset” status and exhibit more equity-like behaviour 
during the sovereign debt crisis, with positive and strongly significant co-movements 
relative to the stock market. Our estimates indicate that the equity beta switches from 
negative to positive when a sovereign’s credit spread rises above 2%. We find that the 
decoupling of the government bond market between high risk and low risk countries implies 
that indiscriminate portfolio diversification does not pay. Instead, “prudent diversification” 
appears to offer superior risk adjusted returns in periods of sovereign stress and through 
the economic cycle. 
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1. Introduction 
Common distinctions between “safe” and “risky” assets have been called into question 
following the Great Recession that affected global markets after 2007. The abnormally high 
credit spreads observed for a number of government securities in developed economies, 
previously considered virtually riskless, mark a paradigm shift in investors’ perceptions with 
profound implications for pricing, hedging and portfolio allocation strategies. The 2010-13 
European sovereign debt crisis offers the perfect setting to analyse the determinants of 
government bond returns and to study how the importance of these determinants changes 
over time. Specifically, an equity risk factor has long been used in the finance literature to 
explain government bond returns (Fama and French, 1993). It is well documented that, in 
crisis periods, government bonds and stocks exhibit negative co-movements, which result in 
a negative beta for the equity risk factor. When uncertainty is high, investors migrate away 
from stock markets and buy government bonds which are perceived to be safer (Connolly et 
al., 2005). However, with higher levels of sovereign default risk this flight-to-safety behaviour 
is no longer justified.  
We contribute to the literature in a number of ways. First, so far researchers have focused 
on a macro narrative to explain sign changes in stock-bond correlation over time (Campbell 
et al., 2016; David and Veronesi, 2013; Burkhardt and Hasseltoft, 2012; Ermolov, 2015; Song, 
2016). We offer another interpretative angle and conclude that stock-bond co-movements 
respond to the level of sovereign credit risk. This measure complements the existing macro-
interpretation as the level of sovereign risk can be seen as a synthesis of the factors that affect 
the sovereign’s macroeconomic profile (Gapen et al., 2008 and Gray et al., 2007). However, 
we show that this measure can prove more effective than key macro-variables at capturing 
the switch in sign of stock-bond correlations observed during the sovereign crisis. It could also 
prove particularly useful in countries where readily available macro-indicators are few. Figure 
I gives a stylized description of our findings. We observe that the correlation between stock 
and government bond returns becomes positive for high risk countries at the start of the 
sovereign debt crisis. This suggests that bonds issued by governments with a poor credit 
profile behave more like equities rather than safe assets when economic conditions 
deteriorate. Specifically, we find that the critical threshold for the stock-bond correlation to 
switch sign occurs when sovereign credit spreads go beyond 2%. 
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Campbell et al. (2015) provide further insights into stock-bond covariation and suggest 
that the monetary policy stance, in addition to macro-economic shocks, can be a contributing 
factor in the US market. However, interest rate policy cannot be a driving factor of the sign 
switch of stock-bond correlation within the Eurozone. This is because all the countries in the 
Eurozone are subject to the same central bank decisions, while the sign switch only occurs in 
a sub-group of these countries, that is, those with high sovereign risk. Hau and Lai (2016) point 
out that a common monetary policy in the Eurozone can still generate different asset 
allocation incentives in member countries due to differences in real rates. This is because of 
divergence in local inflation among Eurozone countries. When we control for local inflation 
levels we still find that sovereign risk is an important factor to explain stock-bond co-
movements in high risk countries.  
Further, in response to the crisis, the European Central Bank (ECB) has used 
unconventional monetary policy measures (quantitative easing or QE) to boost government 
bond markets via direct bond purchases (Eser and Schwaab, 2016). QE would often lead to a 
positive stock market reaction. The resulting upward pressure in both stock and bond prices 
could contribute to positive stock-bond correlation. The evidence, however, rules out this 
explanation. Instead of observing positive stock and bond market returns in high risk 
countries during the first part of the sovereign crisis when stock-bond correlation turns 
positive, we see mostly negative returns in both markets. 
Our sovereign risk argument finds indirect support in the findings of Weigel and Gemmill 
(2006) who observe a positive relationship between stock markets and the distance to default 
of emerging economies. The implication is that in the countries with relatively high risk in 
their sample (Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela and Mexico) an increase in country risk and 
government bond yields leads to a fall in stocks. This generates a positive stock-bond 
relationship. Similar findings are obtained from a larger sample of emerging economies by 
Longstaff et al. (2011). An explanation of this positive relationship could come from the 
sovereign ceiling channel described by Almeida et al. (2016) whereby sovereign rating 
downgrades, resulting in lower bond prices, generate a deterioration of credit quality across 
the private sector (i.e. lower stock prices).1 A similar impact on stock and bond prices would 
                                                          
1 The positive relationship between the level of credit risk and the level of stock-bond correlation was also 
observed in the US corporate bond market. Blume et al. (1991) report a strong positive correlation between 
S&P500 stocks and high-yield corporate bonds (.52) during the 1980s. Investment grade and sovereign bonds 
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also be reached when it is the private sector that produces negative spillovers on the 
government’s creditworthiness. For instance, higher corporate default can bring about lower 
tax revenue and onerous bailout packages that can have serious consequences for public 
finances and sovereign default risk.2 Acharya et al. (2014) illustrate this point in the context 
of the Great Recession and bank bailouts. 
As a second contribution, our work documents a departure from the findings of earlier 
research that suggest positive stock-bond correlation to be associated with periods of 
stagflation, i.e. when inflation is countercyclical (Burkhardt and Hasseltoft, 2012; Campbell et 
al., 2016; Song, 2016). However, during the sovereign crisis, high risk European countries, 
whose government bonds exhibited positive equity betas, were characterised by a procyclical 
inflation scenario with low growth and low inflation.  
Our third contribution is an analysis of the portfolio allocation implications of our findings. 
The decoupling of the European sovereign bond market between high risk and low risk 
countries implies that sovereign bonds cannot be regarded as a homogenous asset class. As 
high risk sovereign bonds behave more like equities they no longer represent a hedge against 
stock market risk, no longer receive flight-to-safety funds, and their use for diversification 
purposes is profoundly altered. When looking at risk adjusted returns we reach the conclusion 
that indiscriminate diversification does not pay. It is best to diversify across low risk countries, 
with bond investments, equity investments or a mixture of the two. The upshot is that 
“prudent diversification” is a winning strategy both during crises and through the business 
cycle. Specifically, we observe that bonds from low risk countries appear to outperform all 
other portfolios considered across the crisis periods. This is due to particularly good risk 
adjusted returns during the subprime (2007-2009) and the first phase of the sovereign crisis 
(2010-2011) as they benefited from a flight-to-safety. However, low risk stocks appear to be 
the best through-the-cycle investment in risk adjusted terms. Given these findings, it is not 
surprising that a “pension fund” strategy, which diversifies across low risk stocks and low risk 
bonds, generates good Sharpe ratios both over the crisis periods and through the cycle.  
                                                          
are also positively correlated with stocks in that period but to a lower degree (.37 and .34 respectively). Reilly 
et al. (2009) show that, after the start of the new millennium, US investment grade corporate bonds become 
negatively related to the stock market. On the other hand, high yield corporate bonds remain positively 
related with the stock market throughout the sample period (1986-2009), an indication that these securities 
have consistently shown an “equity component” (Fridson, 1994). 
2 We thank the referee for making this point.  
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Our fourth contribution is to show how the importance of credit and liquidity 
determinants varies across Euro-zone countries and between calm and crisis periods. We 
observe that market liquidity risk becomes statistically significant during the subprime and 
sovereign crisis periods. This is consistent with Beber et al. (2009) who conclude that credit 
risk usually accounts for the largest part of sovereign bond spreads but liquidity risk gains 
importance in times of market uncertainty. However, we find that liquidity risk does not affect 
countries indiscriminately, but only those that run into financial difficulties or are likely to be 
unable to service their debt. This establishes a plausible connection between liquidity and the 
level of credit risk faced by a sovereign (Pelizzon et al., 2016). We also show that credit risk 
does not appear to be priced before the subprime crisis but is important during the sovereign 
crisis. Interestingly, the influence of credit risk on bond returns drastically varies across 
countries. In low risk countries, the credit risk factor is positively related with bond returns. 
But, this relationship is negative and highly statistically significant in high risk countries. 
Hence, the empirical evidence strongly supports a flight-to-safety from high risk countries to 
low risk countries when sovereign default risk increases.  
In this paper we focus on observable risk factors of sovereign bond yield changes. A 
related strand of the literature has also investigated unobservable factors. Geyer et al. (2004) 
and Favero et al. (2010) find that EMU sovereign yield spreads are largely driven by an 
unobservable time-varying common factor. Riedel et al. (2013) show that sovereign yield 
spreads also depend on an unobservable endogenous sovereign credit cycle. More recently, 
Kinateder and Wagner (2016) estimate time-varying unobservable common shocks on EMU 
government bond yield changes while allowing for heterogeneous country effects. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Variables description and model specification 
are presented in Section 2. Section 3 provides details of our data. In Sections 4 and 5 we 
discuss our results and robustness tests. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
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2. The model 
  To study the determinants of European government bond returns and their time varying 
behaviour we estimate the following panel regression model over four distinct time periods: 
pre-crisis, subprime crisis and the acute and recovery phases of the sovereign crisis: 
 
RBi,cr,t − RECBt
= c + ωi + βEQT(EQTcr,t − RECBt) + βCDS∆CDScr,t +  βSPR∆Spri,cr,t + ϵi,cr,t  
(1) 
where 𝑅𝐵𝑖,𝑐𝑟,𝑡 denotes the mid-price return for bond 𝑖 issued by country 𝑐𝑟 on day 𝑡, 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐵𝑡 
represents the 3 month ECB yield, 𝐸𝑄𝑇𝑐𝑟,𝑡 is the country specific stock index return, ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑐𝑟,𝑡 
is the change in country specific 5 year CDS spreads, ∆𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑖,𝑐𝑟,𝑡 is the change in bond specific 
bid-ask spread, ωi  are bond fixed effects, and 𝑐  is the constant. We use a (within) panel 
estimator and panel robust standard errors. Following Cameron and Trivedi (2005) fixed 
effects are captured by demeaning the dependent and explanatory variables at the bond 
level.3 To ensure that no extreme movements bias our results, all return and change variables 
employed throughout our analysis are winsorized at 1% - 99% considering all observations 
available, country by country, in each sub-period. All panel regressions are estimated with 
daily data.  
The above model is in the spirit of Fama and French (1993) with the addition of the bid-
ask spread variable to control for liquidity effects.4 However, differently from the original 
Fama and French model we do not explicitly consider a TERM factor. TERM is a proxy for 
maturity effects, or unexpected changes in interest rates, and is usually defined as the 
difference between a long-term government bond return and a short-term rate. The reason 
for its exclusion is that TERM is dominated by its first component, the long-term government 
bond return, which makes it undistinguishable from the dependent variable for bonds with 
long maturities. This severely impairs our ability to make any meaningful statistical inference 
regarding our main explanatory variables.5 Moreover, maturity effects tend to correlate with 
credit (and, to some extent, liquidity) effects which are already captured by our explanatory 
                                                          
3 See Cameron and Trivedi (2005) pp. 697–706. 
4 Other studies also use liquidity measures in the CAPM framework. For instance, Li et al. (2009) implement a 
similar approach when analysing the effect of market-wide liquidity in the US treasury market. 
5 See Section 5.4 for a more detailed discussion regarding the TERM factor. 
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variables. In the robustness Section we also control for maturity effects by interacting the 
equity factor with maturity dummies and by employing duration adjusted bond excess 
returns. Our main findings remain unaltered.  
As a credit risk proxy we use the changes in 5 year CDS prices. Unlike credit ratings, which 
may be “sticky”, CDS contracts are traded daily and represent the creditworthiness of an 
entity as viewed by the market rather than a rating agency. One problem when using CDS 
spreads is that these instruments may not be an accurate measure of default risk. Blanco et 
al. (2005) offer evidence that CDS spreads are considerably larger than credit bond spreads 
for US and European investment grade bonds. In more recent work, Bongaerts et al. (2011) 
find significant and robust evidence of a liquidity factor in corporate CDSs. Tang and Yan 
(2008), Chen et al. (2013), and Corò et al. (2013) reach similar conclusions for the corporate 
CDS market. Although we are aware of this issue, we assume that the liquidity bias is smallest 
for the 5 year CDS contract, as it is the most traded maturity (Gyntelberg et al., 2013).  
The liquidity variable ∆𝑆𝑝𝑟  represents changes in bond specific proportional bid-ask 
spreads. Darbha and Dufour (2015) implement a horserace between several liquidity proxies 
on Eurozone sovereign bond markets and conclude that the proportional bid-ask spread is 
the most effective in capturing the variation of bond yields. Although our analysis examines 
bond returns instead of yields, we also expect the bid-ask spread to provide the best 
representation of illiquidity throughout our sample.  
3. Data 
In this study, we use a comprehensive database of tick-by-tick tradable prices for 
European government bonds provided by the MTS intra-dealer platform of the London Stock 
Exchange. MTS comprises bond information from 18 local cash markets and the European 
Benchmark Market, or EuroMTS, where only Euro benchmark bonds are traded. 6  Euro 
benchmark bonds must have an outstanding value of at least €5 billion (Dufour and Skinner, 
2004) and their quotes can be submitted simultaneously to both the local cash platform and 
EuroMTS. With an average daily turnover of more than €100 billion as of mid-2014, MTS 
                                                          
6 As of May 2014, available Euro denominated bond cash markets include Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. The other seven cash markets are Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Israel, Poland, Slovenia, and United Kingdom. 
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provides the best data source for the analysis of European government bonds. 7  More 
information regarding the market microstructure of the MTS platforms is presented in 
Cheung et al. (2005) and Dunne et al. (2006) whereas the price discovery mechanisms are 
discussed in Dufour and Nguyen (2011) and Caporale and Girardi (2013).8 Beber et al. (2009) 
use the MTS data to construct bond liquidity and order flow measures. 
Starting in April 2003, MTS Time Series offers high frequency historical bond data that 
contain the best three bid and ask prices together with their corresponding tradable sizes, 
and complete information regarding executed trades. Quote updates have time stamps with 
millisecond precision and, starting in 2013, with microsecond precision. We consider only the 
information for the best bid and ask prices throughout the analysis. Our sample covers a 
period of more than 10 years, from April 2003 to December 2013, and includes 562 
government bonds that belong to 11 Euro-zone countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. All selected bonds are fixed-
coupon benchmark bonds, have a maximum time to maturity of 51 years and trade on both 
the local cash market and EuroMTS.9  
As is the case with any high frequency dataset, some steps are required to clean the data 
before they can be used in the analysis:  
i. We select only quotes and trades recorded when the market is open, between 
8:15 AM and 5:30 PM Central European Time (CET).  
ii. Quote information from both the local market and EuroMTS is consolidated to 
form a new order book. We then use the consolidated order book to obtain the 
bond mid-price available at 5:00 PM CET each day.10 
iii. All quote updates that have a bid price higher than or equal to the ask price are 
eliminated.  
                                                          
7 For a comparison between MTS and other electronic platforms on European government bonds see Dunne et 
al. (2006), Persaud (2006) and ECB (2004, 2007). 
8 Also see Albanesi and Rindi (2000) for the evolution and market microstructure of MTS Italy, the institutional 
design model for EuroMTS and all other MTS cash markets. 
9 It is worth mentioning that bonds become benchmark bonds when the issue size criterion is met. As a result, a 
bond need not be a benchmark bond when issued, but can gain the benchmark status at a later date. This 
happens because some bonds are sold on the primary market in several tranches or tap sales. It is at the time 
when the bond receives the benchmark status that the bond starts trading on EuroMTS. We include in our 
analysis only the time period after the bond has received the Euro benchmark flag.  
10 Note that from the end of 2011 quotes for Greek bonds are no longer available on the MTS platform.  Also, 
from 1st Jan 2010, we use the Composite Bloomberg Bond Trader (CBBT) mid-prices for Portuguese bonds 
because the firm bid and ask quotes posted on MTS are extremely wide making the mid-point prices very volatile.      
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iv. We also address the issue of extremely high intraday bid-ask spreads by using a 
bond specific filter. The filter is applied each year and excludes the top 1% bid-ask 
spreads for each bond. This filter removes extreme and untradeable quote 
revisions without hindering the informational content of the order book.  
We build our daily liquidity proxy for each bond as the average of all intra-day proportional 
bid-ask spreads weighted by the length of time each spread is displayed in the order book. 
For our credit risk factor we use daily 5 year CDS prices from Bloomberg. The CDS data is 
sourced from Credit Market Analysis (CMA) as the average of New York and London daily 
close prices.11 To illustrate how our liquidity and credit variables behave through time, Figure 
II shows the daily 5 year CDS spreads and average proportional bid-ask spreads for the 11 
countries considered. Key crisis events are marked by spikes in our daily aggregate measures 
of credit and liquidity in each country. For the equity factor we employ daily stock index data 
from Datastream. Finally, our proxy for the risk-free rate is the 3 month ECB AAA yield. The 
ECB reports this measure daily starting from 6th September 2004. To obtain constant maturity 
yields, the ECB uses a Svensson (1994) fitting procedure on Euro-zone benchmark bond data 
of countries rated AAA by Fitch.    
 
4. Results 
Table I presents the mean and standard deviation for daily bond and stock returns by 
country. Countries are listed in a way that easily enables us to form groups that share common 
return characteristics on a consistent basis, as we will show in the rest of the analysis. Finland, 
Germany and the Netherlands are at the top of the list and we label them as “low risk”. 
Austria, Belgium and France, are “medium risk” sovereigns. Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal 
and Spain are “high risk” countries.  
We have identified four main sub-periods in our sample. The first is the pre-crisis, before 
August 2007, which is characterised by economic expansion and low market volatilities in 
                                                          
11 Bloomberg reports CMA CDS prices starting 01 Oct 2004 for Austria, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece. 
For the other 5 Euro-zone countries in our analysis, the starting date of the CDS data varies: 25 Jan 2005 for 
Germany, 29 Sep 2005 for the Netherlands, 25 Apr 2005 for Finland, 17 Aug 2005 for France, and 09 Jan 2008 
for Ireland. Similar to Beber et al. (2009), a complete dataset of CDS prices are obtained using linear 
interpolation. Note that when we eliminate all interpolated data our results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
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most of the countries in our sample. The level of interest rates in the Euro-zone increases in 
this period. As a result, average bond returns are negative for all the 11 countries under 
analysis. However, stock returns are generally positive over the same period. 
In August 2007, PNB Paribas closed down three of their hedge funds highly specialized in 
US mortgage debt. This is one of the early events that signal major problems in the subprime 
market. Sovereign bond return averages become positive, with the exception of Greece, and 
may be indicative of a “flight-to-safety” as stock returns turn negative across Europe. We 
choose January 2010 as the start of the sovereign crisis in Europe. This is the time when 
investors learn that Greece might struggle to repay its debt. We split this period into two 
parts, each sub-period with a length of two years (from January 2010 to December 2011 and 
from January 2012 to December 2013), where we observe rather distinct bond and stock price 
movements.12  
As shown in Figure I, in the first part of the sovereign debt crisis the bond market in the 
high risk countries become positively correlated with their stock markets. Investors now may 
perceive government securities from high risk sovereigns to be similar to stocks, that is, as if 
they were risky assets. On the contrary, the correlation between stocks and bonds in low risk 
countries remains negative in the first part of the sovereign crisis. This is also reflected in 
Table I where low risk bonds have positive mean returns during this sub-period. By contrast, 
high risk bonds have negative mean returns similar to most stock markets. The only 
exceptions are the equity markets in Finland and Ireland which are mildly positive, though 
both exhibit much higher volatility relative to pre-crisis levels. 
In the second part of the sovereign debt crisis we observe reversals that may indicate the 
start of a recovery phase. Indeed, bond returns in low risk countries go back to pre-crisis 
(negative) levels. On the other hand, returns for all stock markets, and bond markets in high 
risk economies, become positive. Likely, higher confidence that a recovery is underway 
encourages investors to move away from low yielding safe assets and towards more risky 
ones, which represents a “flight-to-yield”. Government bond returns for Greece in this sub-
period are not reported due to the scarcity of reliable data. In this phase of the crisis, most 
Greek bonds were traded a few hours per day or not at all.  
                                                          
12 As a robustness test we change the cut-off point between the acute and recovery phases of the sovereign 
crisis from 1st January 2012 to 1st July 2012. This is roughly the time when credit default swap spreads start to 
fall (see Figure II). The results remain qualitatively the same.   
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We further explore the relationship between bond returns on one end and stock returns 
as well as credit and liquidity variables on the other, with univariate regressions, before 
employing the full regression model in Equation (1). Figure III presents the results when the 
equity, credit and liquidity factors are employed separately as the only explanatory variable. 
The signs of the equity betas confirm the findings previously described in Figure I. As 
expected, there is virtually no indication that either credit or liquidity factors influence 
sovereign bond prices in the pre-crisis period.  
During the subprime crisis, CDS price changes in low risk countries are positively and 
statistically significantly related to bond returns. This suggests that higher credit risk in the 
local sovereign bond market does not deter investors from buying such securities. The likely 
implication is that as risk increases in all markets, those that are perceived to be less risky 
become winners, which is a classic flight-to-safety scenario. Indeed, for countries that later 
experienced solvency problems higher credit risk is associated with negative bond returns as 
investors shift to safer assets. The distinction between high and low risk countries becomes 
clear in the first part of the sovereign debt crisis when high risk countries exhibit a negative 
and statistically significant CDS coefficient which persists into the second part of the crisis.  
With respect to liquidity effects, the coefficients of bid-ask spread changes are statistically 
significant only for high risk countries and with a negative sign. This phenomenon is similar to 
the one documented by Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012) in the US corporate bond market during the 
subprime crisis. They find that AAA corporate bonds are not affected by liquidity risk whereas 
lower-grade corporates are. This result is viewed as indicative of a flight from low to high 
grade corporates in times of crisis. This explanation would fit with the negative sovereign 
bond return of high risk countries and positive return of low risk countries in the first phase 
of the sovereign crisis (see Table I). In contrast, during the subprime crisis, we find a negative 
and significant liquidity coefficient for most of the high risk countries even though bond 
returns are mostly positive. This suggests a repositioning of investors from the stock market 
(where returns are mostly negative) into both high and low risk government bonds. 
Moreover, the repositioning in high risk countries would be, more specifically, towards liquid 
bonds. This is because the negative liquidity beta of high risk sovereigns indicates that only 
bonds with a contraction in bid-ask spreads would benefit from a positive return. 
Next, we combine equity, credit and liquidity factors in our multivariate regression 
analysis. Results are reported in Table II. The findings are broadly in line with our preliminary 
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intuitions based on the univariate analysis. However, the stock market coefficient for high risk 
countries is statistically significant and negative during the first part of the sovereign debt 
crisis period, contrary to what observed in the univariate case. This counter-intuitive result 
can be explained by the high negative correlation between the credit risk factor and the stock 
market in a crisis, which causes the latter to flip sign. As done in previous studies (e.g. Fama 
and French, 1993; Petkova 2006) we control for the interference generated by highly 
correlated variables through orthogonalization. Specifically, we replace the credit risk factor 
with its innovations, that is, the residuals obtained by regressing the factor against all the 
other explanatory variables in Equation (1).  The results of the new model are reported in 
Table III and are now fully consistent with our prior expectations. We confirm a strong flight-
to-safety episode during the first part of the sovereign bond crisis when Euro zone investors 
move funds away from both stocks and bonds of high risk countries towards government 
bonds of low risk countries. 
 
4.1. Time-varying equity beta 
Table III clearly highlights that the equity beta of government bond returns is time varying. 
However, our results so far are silent about the factors behind such time variation. Therefore, 
we test a time series regression model over the whole sample period where the equity beta 
is allowed to vary over time. Its time variation is generated by the interaction between the 
equity factor and a selection of explanatory variables. These include macroeconomic 
fundamentals and financial variables we draw from the literature (details are shown in 
Appendix A) or, as an alternative, a country risk threshold indicator. We have computed daily 
changes of monthly/quarterly macro-variables by equally distributing the change in the 
relevant variable across all the trading days in the month/quarter. The model is estimated 
separately for each country and is specified as follows, 
𝑅𝐵𝑡 − 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐵𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝜃0(𝐸𝑄𝑇𝑡 − 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐵𝑡) + ∑ 𝛿𝑗
𝑗
𝑋𝑗,𝑡(𝐸𝑄𝑇𝑡 − 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐵𝑡) + 𝜀𝑡 
            (2) 
where 𝑅𝐵𝑡  is the average daily return across all benchmark bonds available for a specific 
country at time t and  𝑋𝑗,𝑡 are the interacted factors. As a country risk indicator we use a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the 5 year sovereign CDS of a country exceeds a 
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pre-defined threshold, and zero otherwise. As a result, the time varying equity beta can be 
expressed as, 
βEQT,t = 𝜃0 + ∑ 𝛿𝑗
𝑗
𝑋𝑗,𝑡 
(3) 
Figure IV shows, at the top, the pattern of the realised CAPM beta of the sovereign bonds 
of high risk versus low risk countries estimated with rolling 1 year time windows. As one 
should expect, these reflect the patterns of stock-bond correlations observed in Figure I, with 
a clear sign switch from negative to positive for high risk countries. In Figure IV we also present 
the plot of the time varying equity beta obtained by interacting the equity factor with our 
country risk dummy alone. The dummy enables our simple specification to capture the equity 
beta sign switch at the time it occurs, i.e. around the beginning of the sovereign crisis. The 
optimal credit spread threshold used to define the dummy is 2% which achieves the maximum 
explanatory power of our regression model across high risk countries.13 The identification of 
a threshold for country risk that can determine a sign switch in the equity beta has profound 
implications. First, it could be used as an important tripwire for fiscal policy makers. Exceeding 
the threshold will entail higher debt servicing costs and it will indicate a time when 
government bonds may no longer be treated by investors as a hedge against stock market 
risk. This alone may cause bond yields to go even higher producing a vicious circle with 
potentially serious repercussions for the sustainability of public debt and important 
consequences for public spending and taxation. Second, monetary policy could also be 
influenced by the threshold. The ECB intervened vigorously with unconventional measures to 
prevent or counter excessive government bond yields during the sovereign crisis. Our 
threshold could be used, alongside other indicators, to inform and guide central banks’ 
decisions on when bond buying programmes are needed to pre-empt large sell offs of 
government debt from investors. Third, the country risk threshold could also be embedded in 
systemic risk and stress testing models, now widely used by macro prudential regulators, as 
a crisis indicator.  
                                                          
13 We have tried different thresholds 25 basis points apart from 1% to 3% and found 2% to be the best one. 
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Next, we test whether macro-variables as well as changes in sovereign CDS spreads and 
bond bid-ask spreads can explain the sign change in equity beta. As show in Figure IV we find 
that, like the country risk dummy, they do capture the change in sign. However, with the 
country risk dummy the sign switch of the conditional equity beta occurs at the same time as 
for the realised beta, i.e. at the beginning of the sovereign crisis. But, when using macro and 
other financial factors the sign switch is anticipated to the middle of the sub-prime crisis, 
more than a year earlier, which is not consistent with observed data. The conditional equity 
betas in Figure IV are estimated with alternative specifications of Equation (2) where the 
excess return of the equity factor is interacted with the country risk dummy alone (second 
graph of Figure IV) or with all the macro factors with the exclusion of the country risk dummy 
(third graph). The regression results of these alternative models are reported in Table IV 
(Model II and IV respectively) together with other specifications. By adding sequentially macro 
factors (results unreported) we found that the determining macro variable to explain the sign 
switch in equity beta, though with imperfect timing, appears to be the 5 year correlation 
between economic growth (proxied with industrial production) and inflation. However, we 
observed that growth-inflation correlation alone could not achieve this outcome but only 
through a complex interaction with other macro factors. Also, while in the literature 
(Burkhardt and Hasseltoft, 2012; Campbell et al., 2016; Song, 2016) such correlation is 
negatively related to the equity beta, we find that its sign and significance vary widely across 
countries (Models III to V). Indeed, if we look at its sign when used with all other macro and 
financial variables (Model IV) it is positive and highly statistically significant for Netherlands, 
Austria, Belgium and Spain, negative and highly significant for Germany, Finland, Italy, 
Portugal and Greece and not significant for France and Ireland. So, the observation in the 
literature that stock bond covariance (or equity beta) is positive when inflation and economic 
growth are inversely related (e.g. in stagflation periods) and negative when inflation and 
growth are positively related (e.g. during the subprime and sovereign crisis when both were 
low) does not appear to have general validity. Indeed, when inspecting such relationship 
graphically we could not find obvious patterns. When adding to the macro factors the country 
risk dummy (Model V) the growth-inflation correlation turns consistently negative but only 
for high risk countries. 
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4.2. Implications for portfolio allocation 
Our regression results reveal a clear decoupling between high and low risk bond returns 
starting from the beginning of the sovereign crisis. The contrasting sign of the returns 
between the two types of sovereign debt and their different relationship with key risk factors 
suggest a radical shift in investors’ behaviour. Here, we explore how such phenomenon may 
affect investors with different risk appetite and asset allocation strategies. Specifically, we 
look at how the crises have altered diversification opportunities across stocks and bonds. To 
address these points we first group stocks and bonds according to the risk profile of the 
country of issue. We call “low risk” assets those issued in low risk countries, namely Germany, 
Finland and Netherlands, while “high risk” assets are issued in Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland 
or Greece. Table V presents the descriptive statistics and correlations between the asset 
classes in each time period. As one would expect, correlations between the high risk and low 
risk stocks is high throughout the sample period with its peak during the subprime crisis at 
91%.  
More importantly, while correlation between the high and low risk bond portfolios is high 
in the pre-crisis and subprime periods (99.5% and 87.9% respectively), it drops dramatically 
and even turns negative during the two phases of the sovereign crisis (-19.6% and -17.6% 
respectively). This is strong evidence of the deep decoupling in the European sovereign bond 
market between high and low risk countries. The two types of government securities are 
clearly perceived and traded as if they were different asset classes: one as a safe asset to 
invest into in a crisis, the other, more like stocks, as a higher yield asset to invest into in 
recovery periods. Indeed, the correlations between high risk bonds and stocks become 
substantially positive during the sovereign crisis, while it was markedly negative in previous 
periods. 
Clearly, this sharp change in correlation has major implications for fund managers and 
how they can diversify risk. To explore this point we build five equally weighted asset 
portfolios that differ by asset composition (diversified as opposed to concentrated) and risk 
profile (low or high risk). The portfolios are (1) a pure bond fund with equally weighted bond 
indices of low and high risk countries, (2) a pure equity fund with equally weighted equity 
indices of low and high risk countries, (3) a diversified fund that includes all the above, (4) a 
pension fund, with low risk stocks and bonds and (5) a hedge fund with positions in high risk 
stocks and bonds. Next, we look at the risk adjusted returns of each portfolio, before and 
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during the crisis periods, with modified Sharpe ratios. It is well known that the Sharpe ratio is 
uninformative when returns are negative, since higher volatility will increase the ratio (i.e. it 
would make it less negative) thus reversing its usual interpretation. The solution proposed by 
Israelsen (2005) addresses this problem.14 Our main findings, reported in Table VI, are as 
follows.  
First, unsurprisingly, if an investor had perfect foresight they would prefer “pure” portfolio 
strategies, i.e. portfolios that are made of a specific asset class (stocks or bonds) and risk 
profile (high or low) rather than more diversified portfolios. It is interesting that during the 
subprime and sovereign crisis periods bond portfolios exhibit the largest Sharpe ratios. 
Portfolios of sovereign bonds from low risk countries outperform all other pure and 
diversified strategies in the subprime crisis and the first part of the sovereign crisis with a  
modified Sharpe ratio of 0.06 and 0.67 respectively. This is likely the result of a flight-to-safety 
from other asset classes (including high risk sovereign bonds). In the second part of the 
sovereign crisis, which is characterised by a marked recovery, sovereign bonds from high risk 
countries make the largest risk adjusted gains (1.72) and dominate all other strategies. This is 
confirmed by panel D in Table V where we see a mean return of high risk bonds at 13.2% 
which, although lower than that of stocks, is also much less volatile.  
As we extend the holding period we observe that often pure strategies still dominate. Low 
risk bonds exhibit the highest Sharpe ratio (0.17) over the whole crisis period including the 
subprime and sovereign crises. However, low risk stocks appear to be the preferred option 
when we extend the holding period to the pre-crisis (0.27). Both strategies are characterised 
by relatively low diversification (i.e. investment restricted to a specific asset class) and low 
risk. The upshot is that indiscriminate diversification across asset classes is never a winning 
strategy in the observation period. Instead, “prudent diversification”, i.e. restricted to low risk 
assets, yields the best outcomes in risk adjusted terms for buy-and-hold investors. 
Diversifying across asset classes with low risk, the typical approach of a pension fund for 
example, also exhibits consistently good results over longer horizons. This is because low risk 
                                                          
14 Israelsen (2005) reformulates the Sharpe measure as the product (rather than the ratio) of excess returns and 
volatility when excess returns are negative. This implies that the modified Sharpe measure can provide a 
meaningful ranking of portfolio performances. However, the difference between the modified Sharpe measures 
of two portfolios that exhibit excess return of opposite sign cannot be used to quantify the extent to which one 
portfolio is better than the other in risk adjusted terms.  
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government bonds have persistently negative equity beta, which implies that they produce 
substantial diversification gains when combined with stocks.  
 
5. Robustness  
5.1. Quantitative Easing 
During the subprime and sovereign crises, the European Central Bank took extensive 
unconventional monetary policy measures aimed at easing financial conditions. To explore 
the impact of such measures on sovereign bond returns and stock-bond covariances we have 
built dummy variables to capture the above effects in line with previous literature (Alter and 
Beyer, 2014; Beirne et al., 2011; Fawley and Neely, 2013; Fratzscher et al., 2014; 
Krishnamurthy et al., 2014; Szczerbowicz, 2015). We include 4 dummies in our Equation (1) 
which control for the following ECB actions: (1) ECB announcements of unconventional policy 
measures obtained from ECB press releases; (2) allotment days of long-term refinancing 
operations (LTRO) with maturity of 6 months or higher sourced from the ECB history of all 
open market operations; 15  (3) days when securities market programs (SMP) are active 
obtained from weekly ECB financial statements; and (4) days when covered bond purchase 
programmes (CBPP) are active sourced from the ECB statistical data warehouse. We also 
account for changes in broad money supply via conventional ECB policies by including in the 
regression the Euro Area monetary aggregate M3 (available from the ECB statistical data 
warehouse). The monthly change in M3 is distributed equally across all trading days in the 
month. As can be seen in Table VII, our results are robust to the inclusion of ECB 
unconventional and conventional policy dummies. The incremental change in R-squared is 
very small and neither the significance nor the sign of the main coefficients change. We also 
try several alternative model specifications: (a) We include distinct ECB unconventional policy 
dummies for each announcement and intervention date; (b) We replace the SMP and CBPP 
dummy variables with the log of actual ECB purchases under the two programs; and (c) We 
                                                          
15 In response to the deteriorating liquidity conditions experienced by Eurozone banks because of the crisis, 
the ECB decided to (i) extend the maturity of the LTRO above the conventional 3 months and to (ii) offer 
unlimited capital for the same interest rate (fixed-rate full allotment procedure). Thus, the LTRO allotment 
date marks an exceptional demand of capital. 
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consider changes in Euro area total assets instead of the Euro area monetary aggregate M3. 
All these tests do not change qualitatively any of our findings.16 
 
5.2. Flights-to-Safety 
Abnormally large negative correlations may influence, and possibly drive, the sign of our 
equity betas. We have extended our analysis to control for events when stocks and bonds 
exhibit significantly large returns in the opposite direction. Following Baele et al. (2015) and 
Ermolov (2015) we introduce a flight-to-safety dummy that captures instances when bond 
returns are abnormally positive and stock returns are abnormally negative within a specific 
country. “Abnormal” returns are those that deviate from their mean by more than 2 standard 
deviations. Results are reported in Table VIII. Even when controlling for flights-to-safety all 
our main conclusions remain unaltered. Interestingly, the equity beta of Greece becomes 
positive and highly statistically significant during the sub-prime crisis. This suggests that by 
controlling for extreme events when bonds attract flying stock investors, Greek sovereign 
bonds begin to acquire “equity-like” features even before the sovereign debt crisis. 
 
5.3. International Risk Factor and LOIS Spread 
Codogno et al. (2003) and Favero et al. (2010) employ an international risk factor in their 
analysis of European sovereign bond returns. Constructed as the spread between the 10 year 
US interest swap rate and the 10 year Treasury bond rate, this factor is typically viewed as a 
global measure of investors’ risk aversion. Aït-Sahalia et al. (2012) and Schwarz (2016) use the 
LOIS spread given by the difference between the 3 month EURIBOR and EONIA rates, which 
should capture credit and liquidity shocks in the interbank money market. We add changes of 
these two variables to our model in Equation (1) and present the results in Table IX. The 
international risk factor is highly statistically significant and negative in the pre-crisis and 
subprime crisis periods for all countries included in our analysis. However, the effect of this 
factor disappears altogether in the sovereign debt crisis period. This is suggestive of investors 
shifting their attention away from the US markets and focusing more on European risk factors. 
The LOIS spread is highly statistically significant and positive for all countries during all time 
periods except for high risk countries where it dies out with the start of the sovereign debt 
                                                          
16 These results are available on request. 
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crisis. Overall, the combined effect of both factors is substantial during the pre-crisis period 
(i.e. a 6% increase in the R-squared on average), but becomes negligible as the financial crisis 
intensifies. Our results are robust to the introduction of these additional factors. 
 
5.4. The TERM Factor 
Fama and French (1993) include a TERM factor as a determinant of government bond 
returns to capture maturity effects. This is commonly defined as the difference between a 
long-term government bond return and a short-term government bond rate. We build the 
TERM factor as the return difference between a 10 year bond portfolio specific to each 
country and the 3 month ECB rate.17,18 This factor appears to be an appropriate explanatory 
variable for stocks and corporate bonds. However, we note that our TERM factor is 
completely dominated by the long-term bond component as the variability and magnitude of 
the 3 month ECB rate are both relatively much smaller. Table X presents the country specific 
correlation between the TERM factor and excess bond returns for short, medium and long-
term maturity bands. Most countries exhibit very high correlation values especially for 
medium and long-term bonds. To illustrate the negligible impact of the short-term 
government rate in TERM we also report the correlation between the excess bond return and 
TERM defined simply as the 10 year bond return (that is, without subtracting the short-term 
return). Correlations remain virtually unchanged. When using TERM in our regressions 
(unreported results) several variables exhibit counter-intuitive signs and/or statistical 
significance.  
Therefore, instead of employing TERM, we control for maturity effects in two alternative 
ways. First, we interact the equity factor with maturity dummies. As shown in Table XI our 
results are confirmed and the equity like behaviour of high risk bonds during the sovereign 
crisis appears to be pervasive across maturities. Second, following Chen et al. (2007) we also 
run our main regression on bond returns standardised by duration (unreported). Our findings 
remain virtually the same. None of the coefficients changes in sign or significance and R-
squared’s only increase slightly as compared to the ones in the original Table III. We interpret 
this result as further evidence that our results are robust to maturity effects. 
                                                          
17 To build the time series of the 10 year bond portfolio we average, each day, all country specific bond returns 
with a remaining time-to-maturity between 9 and 11 years.    
18 We also consider the 3 month EURIBOR rate instead of the 3 month ECB rate. Results remain unchanged. 
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5.5. Liquidity Proxies 
Besides the bid-ask spread we have looked at other proxies to capture liquidity effects in 
the sovereign bond market. The illiquidity proxy suggested by Schwarz (2016) is a Euro-zone 
market-wide (i.e. systematic) illiquidity measure defined as the yield difference between KfW 
bonds (fully backed by the German government) and Bunds. We have downloaded from 
Bloomberg the daily yield series for 79 KfW bonds from 2003 to 2010. This is the total number 
of KfW bonds that have more than 2 million EUR outstanding over the period. For consistency, 
we also rely on Bloomberg to obtain yield information for the German sovereign bonds in our 
sample. We then follow Schwarz (2016)’s methodology and build the liquidity measure for 3 
maturity bands: 1.5 – 2.5 years, 4.5 – 5.5 years, and 9.5 – 10.5 years. 
The 10 year KFW illiquidity measure presents several discontinuities over the time period 
because of a lack of KfW bonds with a remaining time to maturity of 9.5 – 10.5 years. 
Therefore, we rely on daily changes in the 5 year series. Regression results with the Schwarz 
measure are shown in Table XII. Our main findings remain qualitatively unchanged except for 
occasional higher or lower significance for the CDS and bid-ask spread variables (for low and 
medium risk countries). Surprisingly, during the sub-prime crisis the coefficient of this 
illiquidity proxy is positive and statistically significant for all countries which appears to 
suggest that it may capture illiquidity trends outside the government bond market. The 
implication is that the severe liquidity shortages observed during the sub-prime crisis across 
a number of asset classes have benefited government bonds regardless of country risk, the 
likely result of a flight-to-safety. The same effect remains during the sovereign debt crisis but 
only for low and medium risk countries, as one would expect (though for medium risk 
countries the effect is only significant in the first part of the sovereign crisis). On the other 
hand, high risk countries exhibit a negative and highly statistically significant coefficient which 
again conforms to our expectation of investors moving away from government securities 
when issuing countries experience distress.  
We have also considered depth as an alternative bond-specific liquidity proxy. For each 
intra-day quote update, depth is defined as the average tradable size available at the best bid 
and the best ask. Daily observations are computed as an average of all intra-day depth 
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observations weighted by the time each quote update was available in the order book. This 
variable proved not to be statistically significant in most regressions. 
 
5.6. Predicting Country Risk 
The distinction we make between high, medium and low risk countries is based on ex post 
observation. Peripheral countries were clearly more affected by the sovereign crisis than 
other Euro members. One may wonder whether an investor could draw different lessons from 
our portfolio performance analysis if they could predict which countries would suffer the most 
in a crisis. With this in mind we looked at government bond yields to see if they could enable 
one to predict the decoupling observed during the sovereign crisis. Figure V shows the 1 year 
moving averages of the dummies that capture above median sovereign yields for each 
country at each point in time. It appears that when Lehman’s default occurred (denoted by 
the black vertical line) all low risk countries (Germany, Netherlands and Finland) had 
sovereign bond yields below the median of the 11 sample countries, and the high risk 
countries (Italy, Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Greece) had yields above the median. This is 
interesting and relevant because, at that point in time, an investor who is looking for an exit 
will need to decide which safe assets to invest into. With inference made at that point in time 
we can see that the split that appears between high risk and low risk countries is almost 
identical to that in our original analysis. The only difference is that Belgium would be 
categorised as a high (rather than medium) risk country. We have re-estimated our main 
panel regression with the new groupings.  Our (unreported) results remain qualitatively 
unchanged. Also our conclusions on risk adjusted performance do not change.19  
 
5.7. Other Robustness Tests 
We perform several other robustness tests. First, we change the cut-off date used to split 
the sovereign debt crisis in two intervals from 01 January 2012 to 01 July 2012 as there is a 
clear reduction in both CDS prices and bond bid-ask spreads after this date. Besides some loss 
in coefficient significance for the medium risk countries, the remaining results are virtually 
the same. Second, in the main analysis we use clean price returns. We test whether accrued 
                                                          
19 Results are available from the authors on request. 
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interest has an impact on our results by estimating the dirty price for each bond. We use the 
following formula to compute bond returns:         
 
𝑅𝐵𝑖,𝑡 =
(𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐴𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑖,𝑡)
(𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐴𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1)
 −  1 
(4) 
 
where  𝑅𝐵𝑖,𝑡 represents the bond return of bond 𝑖 on day 𝑡, 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the clean price, 𝐴𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is the 
accrued interest at time t and 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 represents any coupon received in the period 𝑡 − 1 to 𝑡. 
Using dirty price return does not change our conclusions. Finally, to examine the sensitivity of 
our findings to our credit risk proxy, we replace our CDS data sourced from CMA with 5 year 
CDS prices, denominated in US dollars, for our 11 Euro-zone countries with Bloomberg’s 
generic pricing source CBGN. We obtain very similar results with our original ones. 
Furthermore, we also consider 10 year CDS prices sourced from CMA and repeat our analysis. 
Again our findings remain unchanged. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The crises of the last decade offer a unique opportunity to study how the return of 
government bonds and stocks co-move when the market is subject to stress conditions of 
different degree and type. Using a comprehensive dataset of European sovereign bond prices 
stretching over a period of 10 years we find that government bonds of high risk countries lost 
their “safe-asset” status during the recent sovereign debt crisis. They have exhibited more 
equity-like behaviour since then, with positive and strongly significant co-movements relative 
to the stock market as well as abnormally high levels of volatility. We observe that the sign 
switch in stock-bond covariance from negative to positive is primarily associated with high 
levels of sovereign default risk. We identify a credit spread of 2% as the critical default risk 
threshold that is best related to flipping stock-bond covariances. Changes in macro-economic 
fundamentals are less successful in explaining such changes in co-variation. Further, we 
observe that the crisis-induced decoupling in the government bond market between high risk 
and low risk countries appears to generate superior risk adjusted returns for investors that 
engage in “prudent diversification” by focusing on low risk bonds and/or low risk stocks. We 
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also find that indiscriminate diversification yields sub-optimal performance, in risk adjusted 
terms, both in crisis periods and through-the-cycle. 
Both credit and liquidity risks are important factors in explaining the variation of sovereign 
bond returns. But they behave differently depending on the perceived creditworthiness of 
the country. If the country has a low probability of default, then credit impacts positively bond 
returns. For high risk countries the impact is negative. Both these results suggest a flight-to-
safety. The other main risk factor, liquidity risk, seems to affect only distressed countries. 
One of the aspects that we have not explored in this study is the impact on sovereign bond 
returns of an implicit public guarantee that Euro membership may offer. Useful insights on 
this point may be drawn from the studies that look at the pricing implications on agency bonds 
of the implicit support enjoyed by Government Sponsored Enterprises in the US (e.g. Frame 
and White, 2005 and 2007; Passmore, 2005; Hancock and Passmore, 2010). Our analysis 
clearly shows that any implicit guarantee from Euro membership, even if present, was not 
sufficient to prevent the stark decoupling in the sovereign bond market between high risk and 
low risk countries that we have documented. Although this could have distorted the pricing 
of sovereign debt and contained credit and liquidity effects, it is likely that our main 
conclusions would have been stronger if such distortion had been accounted for. How much 
stronger they would have been, and the likely systemic risk repercussions if such guarantee 
became less credible, are interesting topics for future research.
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Table I 
Summary Statistics for Sovereign Bond Returns and Equity Returns 
The table shows the annualized averages and standard deviations of daily sovereign bond and equity returns for each country in our sample in percentage 
points. The pre-crisis covers the time period from 01 Oct 2004 until 31 Jul 2007. The subprime crisis period denotes the time period between 01 Aug 
2007 and 31 Dec 2009. The first part of the sovereign debt crisis goes from 01 Jan 2010 to 30 Dec 2011 and the second part between 01 Jan 2012 to 31 
Dec 2013. The following representative stock market indices are used for each country in our sample: DAX (30 stocks, Germany), AEX (25 stocks, 
Netherlands), OMX Helsinki (25 stocks, Finland), CAC (40 stocks, France), ATX (20 stocks, Austria),  BEL (20 stocks, Belgium), MIB (40 stocks, Italy), IBEX (35 stocks, 
Spain), PSI (20 stocks, Portugal), ISEQ (20 stocks, Ireland), ATHEX (20 stocks, Greece). We employ simple returns following Fama and French (1993). 
Panel A: Sovereign Bond Returns (%) 
  Pre-crisis period  Subprime crisis period  Sovereign crisis period I  Sovereign crisis period II 
  Mean St.Dev.  Mean St.Dev.  Mean St.Dev.  Mean St.Dev. 
Germany  -0.7 3.4  2.6 6.1  3.8 6.3  -1.5 5.4 
Netherlands  -0.9 4.0  3.0 6.2  4.0 6.7  -1.1 5.5 
Finland  -1.1 2.8  2.6 4.2  1.4 4.4  -1.7 4.9 
France  -0.8 4.0  3.2 6.2  1.4 7.1  0.2 5.5 
Austria  -1.4 3.8  2.3 6.6  2.6 6.6  0.1 6.6 
Belgium  -0.9 4.2  2.9 5.9  -0.3 7.5  3.5 5.3 
Italy  -1.0 3.5  2.5 5.1  -6.0 9.4  7.1 8.1 
Spain  -0.9 3.9  2.0 6.4  -2.0 10.3  4.0 10.3 
Portugal  -1.4 3.4  2.4 6.1  -21.4 17.3  22.2 17.6 
Ireland  -0.3 3.8  1.3 6.4  -5.3 18.0  18.1 41.3 
Greece  -1.3 3.5   -1.0 7.2   -26.1 30.4   NA NA 
Panel B: Equity Index Returns (%) 
  Pre-crisis period  Subprime crisis period  Sovereign crisis period I  Sovereign crisis period II 
  Mean St.Dev.  Mean St.Dev.  Mean St.Dev.  Mean St.Dev. 
Germany  24.0 16.8  -8.0 30.5  -0.7 23.8  21.1 16.6 
Netherlands  18.1 15.4  -12.9 33.1  -1.1 21.2  13.1 14.2 
Finland  24.4 14.4  -12.5 32.6  1.2 26.0  20.0 19.5 
France  18.4 14.5  -10.0 31.8  -7.2 25.9  16.4 18.2 
Austria  32.0 15.5  -17.3 38.9  -9.9 26.2  16.0 18.7 
Belgium  22.6 12.4  -17.8 29.2  -6.5 22.2  17.4 15.4 
Italy  14.5 12.2  -16.6 31.8  -16.4 29.3  13.9 24.4 
Spain  21.3 13.1  -3.8 30.7  -11.9 28.7  9.8 23.5 
Portugal  21.0 9.5  -15.1 25.0  -18.1 23.0  10.2 18.4 
Ireland  17.3 14.1  -33.2 40.7  2.7 22.6  22.8 14.6 
Greece  30.6 17.3  -26.4 37.5  -60.6 42.1  26.5 41.5 
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Table II 
Determinants of Excess Sovereign Bond Returns by Country Group 
This table reports panel regression coefficients for the following model: 
𝑅𝐵𝑖,𝑐𝑟,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐵𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝛽𝐸𝑄𝑇(𝐸𝑄𝑇𝑐𝑟,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐵𝑡) + 𝛽𝐶𝐷𝑆∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑐𝑟,𝑡 +  𝛽𝑆𝑃𝑅∆𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑖,𝑐𝑟,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑐𝑟,𝑡    
where RBi,cr,t denotes the mid-price return for bond i issued by country cr on day t, RECBt represents the 3 month ECB yield, EQTcr,t is the country specific stock index return, ∆CDScr,t is the 
change in country specific 5 year CDS spreads, ∆Spri,cr,t is the change in bond specific proportional bid-ask spread. We employ daily observations. For each sub-period, regressions variables are 
winsorized at 1% and 99% taking into account all time-series observations demeaned at the bond level. Sub-periods are from 01 Oct 2004 to 31 Jul 2007 for the pre-crisis, from 01 Aug 2007 to 31 
Dec 2009 for the subprime crisis; the sovereign crisis is split into two parts, from 01 Jan 2010 to 30 Dec 2011 and between 01 Jan 2012 and 31 Dec 2013. White (1980) cross-section standard errors 
and covariances are used. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
  Panel A: Low Risk Countries (Germany, Netherlands and Finland)   Panel B: Medium Risk Countries (France, Austria and Belgium) 
Coefficient  
Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
  Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
𝛽𝐸𝑄𝑇   -0.024 ***  -0.059 ***  -0.087 ***  -0.057 ***    -0.033 ***  -0.060 ***  -0.097 ***  -0.017 * 
𝛽𝐶𝐷𝑆  -0.283  0.893  1.483 ***  1.511 ***    -2.389 *  -0.381  -1.913 ***  -1.649 *** 
𝛽𝑆𝑃𝑅   -0.616  -0.235  -0.265  -0.079    -0.685  -0.130  -0.170 *  0.022 
                  
Adj-R2  1.29%  12.13%  19.09%  6.14%    1.91%  10.29%  9.78%  3.57% 
Per/Cross-sec  643/73  609/84  513/98  507/111    722/68  609/75  513/86  507/108 
#Obs  30,455   35,932   36,737   43,689     33,323   37,427   36,464   42,724 
  Panel C: High Risk Countries (Italy, Ireland, Spain and Portugal)   Panel D: Greece 
Coefficient  
Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
  Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
𝛽𝐸𝑄𝑇   -0.024 ***  -0.045 ***  -0.019 *  0.052 ***    -0.018 ***  -0.018 ***  0.046 **   NA 
𝛽𝐶𝐷𝑆  -0.454  -0.875 ***  -2.161 ***  -2.517 ***    0.669  -1.970 ***  -2.419 ***   NA 
𝛽𝑆𝑃𝑅   -1.422  -0.375 ***  -0.089 ***  0.003    -0.643  -0.082 **  -0.038   NA 
                  
Adj-R2  0.82%  6.15%  27.06%  36.90%    1.01%  6.55%  30.90%  NA 
Per/Cross-sec  722/81  609/105  513/119  507/140    722/26  609/26  390/24  NA 
#Obs  41,646   45,175   50,419   54,385     13,721   12,359   5,007   NA 
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Table III 
Determinants of Excess Sovereign Bond Returns with Orthogonalized Credit Factor 
 
This table reports panel regression coefficients for the following model: 
𝑅𝐵𝑖,𝑐𝑟,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐵𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝛽𝐸𝑄𝑇(𝐸𝑄𝑇𝑐𝑟,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐵𝑡) + 𝛽𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑂∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑂𝑐𝑟,𝑡 +  𝛽𝑆𝑃𝑅∆𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑖,𝑐𝑟,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑐𝑟,𝑡    
where RBi,cr,t denotes the mid-price return for bond i issued by country cr on day t, RECBt represents the 3 month ECB yield, EQTcr,t is the country specific stock index return, ∆CDSOcr,t is the 
change in country specific 5 year CDS spreads orthogonalized with respect to the other regressors,  ∆Spri,cr,t  is the change in bond specific proportional bid-ask spread. We employ daily 
observations. For each sub-period, regressions variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% taking into account all time-series observations demeaned at the bond level. Sub-periods are from 01 Oct 
2004 to 31 Jul 2007 for the pre-crisis, from 01 Aug 2007 to 31 Dec 2009 for the subprime crisis; the sovereign crisis is split into two parts, from 01 Jan 2010 to 30 Dec 2011 and between 01 Jan 
2012 and 31 Dec 2013. White (1980) cross-section standard errors and covariances are used. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
  Panel A: Low Risk Countries (Germany, Netherlands and Finland)   Panel B: Medium Risk Countries (France, Austria and Belgium) 
Coefficient  
Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
  Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
𝛽𝐸𝑄𝑇   -0.024 ***  -0.061 ***  -0.101 ***  -0.068 ***    -0.033 ***  -0.059 ***  -0.052 ***  0.010 
𝛽𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑂  -0.283  0.893  1.483 ***  1.511 ***    -2.389 *  -0.381  -1.913 ***  -1.649 *** 
𝛽𝑆𝑃𝑅   -0.623  -0.228  -0.255  -0.046    -0.704  -0.138  -0.226 **  -0.026 
                  
Adj-R2  1.29%  12.13%  19.09%  6.14%    1.91%  10.29%  9.78%  3.57% 
Per/Cross-sec  643/73  609/84  513/98  507/111    722/68  609/75  513/86  507/108 
#Obs  30,455   35,932   36,737   43,689     33,323   37,427   36,464   42,724 
  Panel C: High Risk Countries (Italy, Ireland, Spain and Portugal)   Panel D: Greece 
Coefficient  
Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
  Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
𝛽𝐸𝑄𝑇   -0.024 ***  -0.039 ***  0.096 ***  0.171 ***    -0.018 ***  0.000  0.184 ***   NA 
𝛽𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑂  -0.454  -0.875 ***  -2.161 ***  -2.517 ***    0.669  -1.970 ***  -2.419 ***   NA 
𝛽𝑆𝑃𝑅   -1.442  -0.406 ***  -0.115 ***  -0.009    -0.642  -0.105 **  -0.076 ***   NA 
                  
Adj-R2  0.82%  6.15%  27.06%  36.90%    1.01%  6.55%  30.90%  NA 
Per/Cross-sec  722/81  609/105  513/119  507/140    722/26  609/26  390/24  NA 
#Obs  41,646   45,175   50,419   54,385     13,721   12,359   5,007   NA 
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Table IV 
Determinants of Excess Sovereign Bond Returns with Time-Varying Equity Beta 
This table reports the results of the following time series regression model estimated separately for each country:  
𝑅𝐵𝑡 − 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐵𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝜃0(𝐸𝑄𝑇𝑡 − 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐵𝑡) + ∑ 𝛿𝑗
𝑗
𝑋𝑗 ∗ (𝐸𝑄𝑇𝑡 − 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐵𝑡) + 𝜀𝑡  
where 𝑅𝐵𝑡 is the average daily mid-price return across all benchmark bonds available for a specific country on day t, RECBt represents the 3 month ECB yield, EQTt is the country 
specific stock index return and Xj represents the following macroeconomic and financial variables (details in Appendix A):  a country risk dummy (SovRisk) which takes the value 1 
when the country’s 5 year sovereign CDS exceeds 2%, output gap, changes in real GDP, changes in debt to GDP ratio, changes in retail sales, changes in unemployment, changes in 
consumer price index, changes in imports, changes in exports, changes in industrial production, changes in M3, changes in economic sentiment, changes in the orthogonalised credit 
default swap spread, ∆CDSOt, changes in average bid-ask spread across all benchmark bonds available for a specific country on day t, ∆Sprt, and the rolling 5-year correlation between 
industrial production growth and inflation, ρ(IP, Inf)
t
. Models I to V represent alternative specifications of the equation above. Model I does not consider any interaction terms. In 
Models II and III excess equity returns are interacted only by the country risk dummy and the correlation between industrial production growth and inflation, respectively. In Model 
IV we use all macro and financial variables excluding the country risk dummy. Finally, Model V includes all the macro and financial variables. In Models IV and V, we only report the 
coefficients for the excess equity return factor and the interacted country risk dummy and the industrial production growth - inflation correlation. The Wald test is used to assess 
whether the coefficients of other interacted factors are jointly equal to 0. We employ daily observations covering the period from 09 Sep 2004 to 31 Dec 2013. Regressions variables 
are winsorized at 1% and 99% on the following sub-periods: 01 Oct 2004 to 31 Jul 2007 (pre-crisis), 01 Aug 2007 to 31 Dec 2009 (subprime crisis), 01 Jan 2010 to 30 Dec 2011 (sovereign 
debt crisis part I), and 01 Jan 2012 to 31 Dec 2013 (sovereign debt crisis part II). White (1980) cross-section standard errors and covariances are used. 
 Model I  Model II  Model III   
Country 𝜃0 Adj-R2  𝛿𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘  𝜃0 Adj-R2  𝛿ρ(IP,Inf) 𝜃0 Adj-R2  #Obs 
Germany -0.077 *** 18%  0.000 -0.077 *** 18%  -0.187 *** -0.070 *** 19%  2273 
Netherlands -0.075 *** 16%  0.000 -0.075 *** 16%  0.340 *** -0.089 *** 17%  2095 
Finland -0.056 *** 17%  0.000 -0.056 *** 17%  -0.085 ** -0.042 *** 17%  2209 
France -0.061 *** 11%  0.110 *** -0.066 *** 12%  -0.042 -0.058 *** 11%  2129 
Austria -0.041 *** 6%  0.041 -0.043 *** 6%  0.220 *** -0.047 *** 7%  2351 
Belgium -0.031 *** 2%  0.104 *** -0.048 *** 5%  0.434 *** -0.040 *** 4%  2351 
Italy 0.056 *** 6%  0.180 *** -0.016 *** 22%  -0.898 *** 0.106 *** 11%  2352 
Spain 0.044 *** 3%  0.192 *** -0.041 *** 18%  0.670 *** -0.002 8%  2352 
Portugal 0.064 *** 2%  0.223 *** -0.047 *** 8%  -0.835 *** 0.142 *** 3%  2351 
Ireland 0.007 0%  0.067 *** -0.019 *** 1%  0.391 0.042 ** 0%  1520 
Greece 0.066 *** 4%  0.175 *** -0.012 ** 12%  -0.650 *** 0.153 *** 8%  1715 
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Table IV - Continued 
 Model IV  Model V   
Country 
Wald F-stat 
∀𝛿𝑗  = 0 excl.  
𝛿ρ(IP,Inf) & 
𝛿SovRisk 
𝛿ρ(IP,Inf) 𝜃0 Adj-R2  
Wald F-stat 
∀𝛿𝑗  = 0 excl.  
𝛿ρ(IP,Inf) & 
𝛿SovRisk 
𝛿ρ(IP,Inf) 𝛿SovRisk 𝜃0 Adj-R2  #Obs 
Germany 2.798*** -0.336 *** -0.062 *** 20%  2.798*** -0.336 *** 0.000 -0.062 *** 20%  2273 
Netherlands 2.445*** 0.454 *** -0.098 *** 18%  2.445*** 0.454 *** 0.000 -0.098 *** 18%  2095 
Finland 2.700*** -0.112 ** -0.031 *** 18%  2.700*** -0.112 ** 0.000 -0.031 *** 18%  2209 
France 1.438 0.051 -0.065 *** 11%  1.373 -0.014 0.118 *** -0.064 *** 13%  2129 
Austria 2.255*** 0.236 *** -0.050 *** 8%  2.192*** 0.227 *** 0.019 -0.051 *** 8%  2351 
Belgium 1.512 0.573 *** -0.041 *** 5%  1.288 0.300 *** 0.084 *** -0.046 *** 7%  2351 
Italy 5.664*** -1.178 *** 0.105 *** 16%  4.115*** -0.415 *** 0.169 *** 0.001 24%  2352 
Spain 8.092*** 0.261 ** 0.072 *** 14%  5.255*** -0.326 *** 0.183 *** -0.008 20%  2352 
Portugal 5.511*** -1.446 *** 0.152 *** 8%  4.220*** -0.545 ** 0.206 *** -0.018 11%  2351 
Ireland 2.078** -0.462 0.031 2%  1.512 -0.467 0.036 * 0.011 2%  1520 
Greece 6.828*** -0.377 ** 0.096 *** 20%  3.411*** -0.253 * 0.106 *** 0.052 ** 20%  1715 
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Table V 
Descriptive Statistics of Bond and Stock Portfolios 
This table presents the mean, standard deviation and correlations between four asset portfolios. LR_Stock and LR_Bond denote low risk stock and bond portfolios that include the stock 
market indices and average sovereign bond returns, respectively, of Germany, Finland and Netherlands. HR_Stock and HR_Bond are high risk stock and bond portfolios that include the stock 
market indices and average sovereign bond returns, respectively, of Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece. The mean return and standard deviation measures have been annualised from 
daily estimates. Sub-periods are from 01 Oct 2004 to 31 Jul 2007 for the pre-crisis, from 01 Aug 2007 to 31 Dec 2009 for the subprime crisis; the sovereign crisis is split into two parts, from 
01 Jan 2010 to 30 Dec 2011 and between 01 Jan 2012 and 31 Dec 2013. 
Panel A: Pre-crisis period   Panel B: Subprime crisis period 
 Mean 
Return 
 Standard 
Deviation 
 Correlations    Mean 
Return 
 Standard 
Deviation 
 Correlations 
   LR_Stock HR_Stock LR_Bond      LR_Stock HR_Stock LR_Bond 
LR_Stock 21.2%  12.6%       LR_Stock -11.8%  30.9%     
HR_Stock 19.7%  10.2%  88.3%     HR_Stock -19.8%  29.3%  91.0%   
LR_Bond -1.0%  2.5%  -14.9% -15.7%    LR_Bond 2.7%  4.2%  -45.7% -44.5%  
HR_Bond -1.4%   2.7%   -14.2% -14.5% 99.5%   HR_Bond 1.4%   4.4%   -30.9% -28.4% 87.9% 
Panel C: Sovereign crisis period I   Panel D: Sovereign crisis period II 
 Mean 
Return 
 Standard 
Deviation 
 Correlations    Mean 
Return 
 Standard 
Deviation 
 Correlations 
   LR_Stock HR_Stock LR_Bond      LR_Stock HR_Stock LR_Bond 
LR_Stock -0.2%  23.1%       LR_Stock 18.7%  16.1%     
HR_Stock -21.5%  24.9%  86.6%     HR_Stock 17.1%  18.6%  77.3%   
LR_Bond 3.5%  4.4%  -61.0% -60.1%    LR_Bond -1.0%  3.7%  -35.6% -33.5%  
HR_Bond -12.3%   11.2%   27.6% 45.0% -19.6%   HR_Bond 13.2%   7.7%   40.0% 42.1% -17.6% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table VI 
Portfolio Performance 
This table presents the modified Sharpe ratio (Israelsen 2005) of various investment strategies. Group bond/stock portfolio returns are obtained as an average of bond/stock portfolio 
returns belonging to the countries inside the group. Country-specific bond portfolio returns are estimated as return averages of all sovereign benchmark bonds of a country. The low risk 
group includes Germany, the Netherlands, and Finland while the high risk group is formed by Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Greece. Excess returns are estimated using the 3 month ECB 
yield as a proxy for the risk-free rate.We employ daily observations. The full sample period covers 09 Sep 2004 to 31 Dec 2013 (FULL). Sub-periods are from 01 Oct 2004 to 31 Jul 2007 for 
the pre-crisis (PRE), from 01 Aug 2007 to 31 Dec 2009 for the subprime crisis (SUB), from 01 Jan 2010 to 30 Dec 2011 and from 01 Jan 2012 to 31 Dec 2013 for the first (SOV I) and second 
(SOV II) part of the sovereign debt crisis, respectively. 
Portfolios Pre Sub Sov I Sov II Sov I + II Sub &  Sov I + II Full 
       
Stock low risk (SL) 1.46 -0.04 -0.00 1.15 0.44 0.01 0.27 
Stock high risk (SH) 1.66 -0.07 -0.05 0.92 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 
Bond low risk (BL) -0.00 0.06 0.67 -0.00 0.23 0.17 -0.00 
Bond high risk (BH) -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 1.72 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
        
Diversified fund (All) 1.26 -0.01 -0.01 1.34 0.17 -0.00 0.05 
High yield fund (SH&BH) 1.27 -0.02 -0.03 1.32 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
Pension fund (SL&BL) 1.18 -0.01 0.11 1.15 0.54 0.04 0.25 
Equity fund (SL&SH) 1.60 -0.05 -0.03 1.09 0.16 -0.01 0.10 
Bond fund (BL&BH) -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 1.53 0.11 0.04 -0.00 
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Table VII  
 Determinants of Excess Sovereign Bond Returns: ECB’s Quantitative Easing and Money Supply Effects 
This table reports panel regression coefficients for the following model: 
𝑅𝐵𝑖,𝑐𝑟,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐵𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝛽𝐸𝑄𝑇(𝐸𝑄𝑇𝑐𝑟,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐵𝑡) + 𝛽𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑂∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑂𝑐𝑟,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑆𝑃𝑅∆𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑖,𝑐𝑟,𝑡 + 𝛽𝐸𝑈𝑅𝑂 𝑀3∆𝐸𝑈𝑅𝑂 𝑀3𝑡 + 𝛽𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑈𝑀 + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝑃𝑆𝑀𝑃𝐷𝑈𝑀      
+ 𝛽𝐶𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐷𝑈𝑀 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑐𝑟,𝑡   
where RBi,cr,t denotes the mid-price return for bond i issued by country cr on day t, RECBt represents the 3 month ECB yield, EQTcr,t is the country specific stock index return, ∆CDSOcr,t is the 
change in country specific 5 year CDS spreads orthogonalized with respect to the other continuous regressors, ∆Spri,cr,t is the change in bond specific proportional bid-ask spread, Announcement 
is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 on dates when the ECB announces unconventional policy measures, LTRODUM is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 on allotment dates for long-
term refinancing operations with a maturity higher than 3 months, SMPDUMand CBPPDUM are dummy variables that take a value of 1 in the weeks (Securities Market Program) or days (Covered 
Bond Purchase Program) when securities were purchased by the ECB, ∆𝐸𝑈𝑅𝑂 𝑀3𝑡 is the percentage change in the Euro Area monetary aggregate M3 (daily series is obtained by assuming each 
monthly change is realised equally, divide by 20, throughout the days of the month it covers). We employ daily observations. For each sub-period, regressions variables are winsorized at 1% and 
99% taking into account all time-series observations demeaned at the bond level. Sub-periods are from 01 Oct 2004 to 31 Jul 2007 for the pre-crisis, from 01 Aug 2007 to 31 Dec 2009 for the 
subprime crisis; the sovereign crisis is split into two parts, from 01 Jan 2010 to 30 Dec 2011 and between 01 Jan 2012 and 31 Dec 2013. White (1980) cross-section standard errors and covariances 
are used. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
  Panel A: Low Risk Countries (Germany, Netherlands and Finland)   Panel B: Medium Risk Countries (France, Austria and Belgium) 
Coefficient  
Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
  Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
𝛽𝐸𝑄𝑇   -0.020 **  -0.036 ***  -0.101 ***  -0.066 ***    -0.031 ***  -0.028 ***  -0.053 ***  0.008 
𝛽𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑂  -0.267  0.847  1.462 ***  1.604 ***    -2.383 *  -0.330  -1.910 ***  -1.523 *** 
𝛽𝑆𝑃𝑅   -0.605  -0.283 *  -0.250  -0.028    -0.693  -0.185 *  -0.218 **  -0.030 
𝛽𝐸𝑈𝑅𝑂 𝑀3  0.001  0.010 ***  0.224  0.967 **    0.001  0.014 ***  1.412 **  1.181 ** 
                  
ECB Dummies  -  -  yes  yes   -  -  yes  yes 
Adj-R2  1.07%  13.62%  19.03%  6.39%    1.71%  12.79%  10.61%  4.02% 
Per/Cross-sec  643/73  609/84  513/98  507/111    722/68  609/75  513/86  507/108 
#Obs  30,455   35,932   36,737   43,689     33,323   37,427   36,464   42,724 
  Panel C: High Risk Countries (Italy, Ireland, Spain and Portugal)   Panel D: Greece 
Coefficient  
Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
  Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
𝛽𝐸𝑄𝑇   -0.015  -0.013 **  0.098 ***  0.170 ***    -0.013 **  0.020 ***  0.175 ***   NA 
𝛽𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑂  -0.467  -0.916 ***  -2.121 ***  -2.506 ***    0.640  -1.976 ***  -2.354 ***   NA 
𝛽𝑆𝑃𝑅   -1.429  -0.445 ***  -0.118 ***  -0.009    -0.659  -0.116 ***  -0.072 ***   NA 
𝛽𝐸𝑈𝑅𝑂 𝑀3  0.002  0.011 ***  1.181 *  -0.255    0.002 *  0.014 ***  -0.911   NA 
                  
ECB Dummies  -  -  yes  yes   -  -  yes  - 
Adj-R2  0.73%  8.15%  27.58%  36.95%    1.13%  9.71%  31.92%  NA 
Per/Cross-sec  722/81  609/105  513/119  507/140    722/26  609/26  390/24  NA 
#Obs  41,646   45,175   50,419   54,385     13,721   12,359   5,007   NA 
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Table VIII 
Determinants of Excess Sovereign Bond Returns with Flights-to-Safety 
This table reports panel regression coefficients for the following model: 
RBi,cr,t − RECBt = c + βEQT(EQTcr,t − RECBt) + βCDSO∆CDSOcr,t + βSPR∆Spri,cr,t + β FTSFTScr,t + εi,cr,t   
where RBi,cr,t denotes the mid-price return for bond i issued by country cr on day t, RECBt represents the 3 month ECB yield, EQTcr,t is the country specific stock index return, ∆CDSOcr,t is the 
change in country specific 5 year CDS spreads orthogonalized with respect to the other regressors, ∆Spri,cr,t is the change in bond specific proportional bid-ask spread, 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑇𝑆𝑐𝑟,𝑡 is a dummy 
variable that takes a value of 1 on days when a flight-to-safety episode is observed. A flight-to-safety episode occurs when the return of the country specific 10Y bond portfolio > 2*StDev(10Y 
bond portfolio return, 2003 -2013) and the return of the stock market return < -2*StDev(stock market return, 2003 -2013). We employ daily observations. For each sub-period, regressions variables 
are winsorized at 1% and 99% taking into account all time-series observations demeaned at the bond level. Sub-periods are from 01 Oct 2004 to 31 Jul 2007 for the pre-crisis, from 01 Aug 2007 
to 31 Dec 2009 for the subprime crisis; the sovereign crisis is split into two parts, from 01 Jan 2010 to 30 Dec 2011 and between 01 Jan 2012 to 31 Dec 2013. White (1980) cross-section standard 
errors and covariances are used. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
  Panel A: Low Risk Countries (Germany, Netherlands and Finland)   Panel B: Medium Risk Countries (France, Austria and Belgium) 
Coefficient  
Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
  Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
𝛽𝐸𝑄𝑇   -0.024 ***  -0.055 ***  -0.094 ***  -0.068 ***    -0.033 ***  -0.054 ***  -0.044 ***  0.010 
𝛽𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑂  -0.283  0.835  1.464 ***  1.511 ***    -2.389 *  -0.480  -1.919 ***  -1.649 *** 
𝛽𝑆𝑃𝑅   -0.623  -0.241  -0.239  -0.046    -0.704  -0.152  -0.211 **  -0.026 
 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝑆   Na  24.545 ***  19.287 ***  Na    Na  36.858 ***  44.259 ***  Na 
                   
Adj-R2  1.29%  12.84%  19.39%  6.14%    1.91%  11.16%  10.74%  3.57% 
Per/Cross-sec  643/73  609/84  513/98  507/111    722/68  609/75  513/86  507/108 
#Obs  30,455   35,932   36,737   43,689     33,323   37,427   36,464   42,724 
  Panel C: High Risk Countries (Italy, Ireland, Spain and Portugal)   Panel D: Greece 
Coefficient  
Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
  Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
𝛽𝐸𝑄𝑇   -0.024 ***  -0.037 ***  0.097 ***  0.171 ***    -0.018 ***  0.097 ***  0.185 ***   NA 
𝛽𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑂  -0.454  -0.901 ***  -2.131 ***  -2.517 ***    0.669  -2.131 ***  -2.443 ***   NA 
𝛽𝑆𝑃𝑅   -1.442  -0.410 ***  -0.113 ***  -0.009    -0.642  -0.113 ***  -0.081 ***   NA 
 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝑆   Na  49.404 ***  137.507 ***  Na    Na  137.507 ***  594.467 ***  Na 
                   
Adj-R2  0.82%  6.57%  27.23%  36.90%    1.01%  27.23%  31.37%  NA 
Per/Cross-sec  722/81  609/105  513/119  507/140    722/26  513/119  390/24  NA 
#Obs  41,646   45,175   50,419   54,385     13,721   50,419   5,007   NA 
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Table IX 
Determinants of Excess Sovereign Bond Returns: International Risk Factor and Libor-OIS Spread 
This table shows panel regression coefficients for the following model: 
𝑅𝐵𝑖,𝑐𝑟,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐵𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝛽𝐸𝑄𝑇(𝐸𝑄𝑇𝑐𝑟,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐵𝑡) + 𝛽𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑂∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑂𝑐𝑟,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑆𝑃𝑅∆𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑖,𝑐𝑟,𝑡 + 𝛽𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅∆𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽𝐿𝑂𝐼𝑆 ∆𝐿𝑂𝐼𝑆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑐𝑟,𝑡    
where RBi,cr,t denotes the bond mid-price return on day t for bond i issued by country cr, RECBt represents the 3 month ECB yield, EQTcr,t is the country specific stock index return, ∆CDSOcr,t is 
the change in country specific 5 year CDS spreads orthogonalized with respect to all the other regressors,  ∆Spri,c,t is the change in bond specific proportional bid-ask spread, ∆IntRt is the change 
in the international risk factor, and ∆LOISt is the change in the Libor-OIS spread. For each sub-period, regressions variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% taking into account all time-series 
observations demeaned at the bond level. We employ daily observations. Sub-periods are from 01 Oct 2004 to 31 Jul 2007 for the pre-crisis, from 01 Aug 2007 to 31 Dec 2009 for the subprime 
crisis; the sovereign crisis is split into two parts, from 01 Jan 2010 to 30 Dec 2011 and from 01 Jan 2012 to 31 Dec 2013. White (1980) cross-section standard errors and covariances are used. ∗∗∗, 
∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  Panel A: Low Risk Countries (Germany, Netherlands and Finland)   Panel B: Medium Risk Countries (France, Austria and Belgium) 
Coefficient  
Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
  Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
𝛽𝐸𝑄𝑇   -0.018 ***  -0.054 ***  -0.093 ***  -0.067 ***    -0.027 ***  -0.051 ***  -0.045 ***  0.010 
𝛽𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑂  -0.648  0.735  1.207 **  1.413 ***    -1.589  -0.439  -2.010 ***  -1.694 *** 
𝛽𝑆𝑃𝑅   -0.895  -0.252  -0.294  -0.087    -0.872  -0.160  -0.239 ***  -0.051 
𝛽𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅   -0.963 ***  -0.566 ***  0.308  -0.127   -1.311 ***  -0.711 ***  -0.119  0.328 
𝛽𝐿𝑂𝐼𝑆  3.871 ***  1.221 ***  2.241 ***  4.640 ***   4.519 ***  1.420 ***  2.385 ***  4.302 ** 
                  
Adj-R2  7.12%  14.22%  20.74%  7.00%    8.23%  13.00%  11.94%  4.60% 
Per/Cross-sec  643/73  609/84  513/98  507/111    722/68  609/75  513/86  507/108 
#Obs  30,455   35,932   36,737   43,689     33,323   37,427   36,464   42,724 
  Panel C: High Risk Credit Countries (Italy, Ireland, Spain and Portugal)   Panel D: Greece 
Coefficient  
Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
  Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
𝛽𝐸𝑄𝑇   -0.019 **  -0.033 ***  0.099 ***  0.171 ***    -0.016 ***  0.005  0.183 ***   NA 
𝛽𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑂  -0.049  -0.949 ***  -2.183 ***  -2.518 ***    0.752  -1.978 ***  -2.442 ***   NA 
𝛽𝑆𝑃𝑅   -1.449 *  -0.435 ***  -0.116 ***  -0.009    -0.723  -0.104 **  -0.078 ***   NA 
𝛽𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅   -1.121 ***  -0.669 ***  0.344  0.236   -1.082 ***  -0.719 ***  -0.673   NA 
𝛽𝐿𝑂𝐼𝑆  3.969 ***  1.241 ***  0.822  -2.318   3.698 ***  1.146 ***  -1.763   NA 
                  
Adj-R2  6.94%  8.89%  27.43%  36.92%    7.37%  8.50%  31.28%  NA 
Per/Cross-sec  722/81  609/105  513/119  507/140    722/26  609/26  390/24  NA 
#Obs  41,646   45,175   50,419   54,385     13,721   12,359   5,007   NA 
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Table X 
Correlation of Excess Sovereign Bond Returns and the Term Factor 
This table reports the correlation of the term factor, and its long term component, with country specific excess 
sovereign bond returns. The term factor is the difference between the return of a sovereign bond portfolio with 
a 10 year average maturity and the 3 month ECB rate. The term factor’s long term component is the return of the 
sovereign bond portfolio with a 10 year average maturity. Short, medium and long denote bonds with a remaining 
time-to-maturity of less than 3 years, between 3 and 7 years, and above 7 years, respectively. Correlations are 
estimate over the full sample period from 01 Oct 2004 to 31 Dec 2013. 
  Term Factor  
Term Factor’s  
Long Term Component 
  
Short 
Maturity  
 
Medium 
Maturity 
 
Long 
Maturity 
 
Short 
Maturity 
 
Medium 
Maturity 
 Long 
Maturity 
Germany  57.44%  89.19%  90.79%  57.45%  89.19%  90.78% 
Netherlands  55.09%  88.50%  89.44%  55.08%  88.48%  89.42% 
Finland  57.40%  85.93%  93.65%  57.36%  85.92%  93.59% 
France  57.89%  87.02%  87.54%  57.87%  87.01%  87.51% 
Austria  51.27%  83.33%  88.22%  51.26%  83.33%  88.20% 
Belgium  56.07%  82.69%  86.53%  56.07%  82.69%  86.53% 
Italy  68.14%  90.49%  92.07%  68.12%  90.48%  92.07% 
Spain  64.31%  88.94%  91.68%  64.29%  88.94%  91.67% 
Portugal  60.47%  83.52%  85.66%  60.46%  83.52%  85.66% 
Ireland  48.94%  72.67%  83.81%  48.94%  72.67%  83.81% 
Greece  42.81%  65.68%  54.29%  42.92%  65.69%  54.28% 
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Table XI  
Maturity Effects 
This table reports panel regression coefficients for the following model: 
𝑅𝐵𝑖,𝑐𝑟,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐵𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝛽𝐸𝑄𝑇𝑆(𝐸𝑄𝑇𝑐𝑟,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐵𝑡) ∗ 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑆𝑀𝐿 + 𝛽𝐸𝑄𝑇𝑀(𝐸𝑄𝑇𝑖,𝑐𝑟,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐵𝑡) ∗ 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐷 + 𝛽𝐸𝑄𝑇𝐿(𝐸𝑄𝑇𝑖,𝑐𝑟,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐵𝑡) ∗ 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝐿𝑁𝐺 + 𝛽𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑂∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑂𝑐𝑟,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑆𝑃𝑅∆𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑖,𝑐𝑟,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑐𝑟,𝑡   
where RBi,c,t denotes the mid-price return for bond i issued by country cr on day t, RECBt represents the 3 month ECB yield, EQTcr,t is the country specific stock index return, ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑂𝑐𝑟,𝑡  is the 
change in country specific 5 year CDS spreads orthogonalized with respect to all the other regressors,  ∆Spri,c,t is the change in bond specific percentage bid-ask spread. We employ daily 
observations. For each sub-period, regressions variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% taking into account all time-series observations demeaned at the bond level. Sub-periods are from 01 Oct 
2004 to 31 Jul 2007 for the pre-crisis, from 01 Aug 2007 to 31 Dec 2009 for the subprime crisis; the sovereign crisis is split into two parts, from 01 Jan 2010 to 30 Dec 2011 and from 01 Jan 2012 
to 31 Dec 2013. White (1980) cross-section standard errors and covariances are used. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
  Panel A: Low Risk Countries (Germany, Netherlands and Finland)   Panel B: Medium Risk Countries (France, Austria and Belgium) 
Coefficient  
Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
  Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
𝛽𝐸𝑄𝑇𝑆   -0.006 ***  -0.020 ***  -0.019 ***  -0.006 ***    -0.008 ***  -0.020 ***  -0.007 *  0.004 * 
𝛽𝐸𝑄𝑇𝑀  -0.028 ***  -0.066 ***  -0.089 ***  -0.045 ***    -0.031 ***  -0.058 ***  -0.028 ***  0.015 * 
𝛽𝐸𝑄𝑇𝐿   -0.044 ***  -0.099 ***  -0.215 ***  -0.142 ***    -0.048 ***  -0.076 ***  -0.107 ***  0.010 
                  
Adj-R2  1.92%  15.55%  30.67%  10.31%    2.20%  11.62%  13.12%  3.77% 
Per/Cross-sec  643/73  609/84  513/98  507/111    722/68  609/75  513/86  507/108 
#Obs  30,455   35,932   36,737   43,689     33,323   37,427   36,464   42,724 
  Panel C: High Risk Countries (Italy, Ireland, Spain and Portugal)   Panel D: Greece 
Coefficient  
Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
  Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
𝛽𝐸𝑄𝑇𝑆   -0.007 ***  -0.016 ***  0.052 ***  0.068 ***    -0.005 ***  -0.001  0.110 ***   NA 
𝛽𝐸𝑄𝑇𝑀  -0.026 ***  -0.043 ***  0.099 ***  0.176 ***    -0.016 ***  -0.002  0.214 ***   NA 
𝛽𝐸𝑄𝑇𝐿   -0.038 ***  -0.052 ***  0.130 ***  0.261 ***    -0.031 ***  0.004  0.218 ***   NA 
                  
Adj-R2  1.00%  7.01%  28.12%  40.74%    1.37%  6.57%  31.67%  NA 
Per/Cross-sec  722/81  609/105  513/119  507/140    722/26  609/26  390/24  NA 
#Obs  41,646   45,175   50,419   54,385     13,721   12,359   5,007   NA 
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Table XII 
Determinants of Excess Sovereign Bond Returns: Schwarz (2016) Illiquidity Measure 
 
This table reports panel regression coefficients for the following model: 
𝑅𝐵𝑖,𝑐𝑟,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐵𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝛽𝐸𝑄𝑇(𝐸𝑄𝑇𝑐𝑟,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐵𝑡) + 𝛽𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑂∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑂𝑐𝑟,𝑡 +  𝛽𝑆𝑃𝑅∆𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑖,𝑐𝑟,𝑡 +  𝛽𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑧∆𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑧𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑐𝑟,𝑡    
where RBi,cr,t denotes the mid-price return for bond i issued by country cr on day t, RECBt represents the 3 month ECB yield, EQTcr,t is the country specific stock index return, ∆CDSOcr,t is the 
change in country specific 5 year CDS spreads orthogonalized with respect to the other regressors, ∆Spri,cr,t is the change in bond specific proportional bid-ask spread, and ∆Schwarzt refers to 
the change in yields between portfolios of KfW bonds and German sovereign bonds with an approximate time-to-maturity of 5 years (i.e. 4.5 – 5.5 years). We employ daily observations.  For each 
sub-period, regressions variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% taking into account all time-series observations demeaned at the bond level. Sub-periods are from 01 Oct 2004 to 31 Jul 2007 for 
the pre-crisis, from 01 Aug 2007 to 31 Dec 2009 for the subprime crisis; the sovereign crisis is split into two parts, from 01 Jan 2010 to 30 Dec 2011 and from 01 Jan 2012 to 31 Dec 2013. White 
(1980) cross-section standard errors and covariances are used. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
  Panel A: Low Risk Countries (Germany, Netherlands and Finland)   Panel B: Medium Risk Countries (France, Austria and Belgium) 
Coefficient  
Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
  Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
𝛽𝐸𝑄𝑇   -0.024 ***  -0.037 ***  -0.067 ***  -0.042 ***    -0.033 ***  -0.034 ***  -0.032 ***  0.006 
𝛽𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑂  -0.252  0.556  0.687 *  0.367    -2.422 *  -0.502  -2.172 ***  -1.743 *** 
𝛽𝑆𝑃𝑅   -0.648  -0.380 **  -0.312  -0.109    -0.717  -0.258 ***  -0.223 **  -0.013 
𝛽Schwarz  0.733  4.873 ***  5.130 ***  4.064 ***    0.301  5.336 ***  2.965 ***  -0.554 
                  
Adj-R2  1.31%  21.68%  26.74%  10.33%    1.91%  20.15%  13.33%  3.66% 
Per/Cross-sec  643/73  609/84  513/98  507/111    722/68  609/75  513/86  507/108 
#Obs  30,455   35,932   36,737   43,689     33,323   37,427   36,464   42,724 
  Panel C: High Risk Countries (Italy, Ireland, Spain and Portugal)   Panel D: Greece 
Coefficient  
Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
  Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
𝛽𝐸𝑄𝑇   -0.024 ***  -0.021 ***  0.075 ***  0.151 ***    -0.018 ***  0.012 *  0.151 ***   NA 
𝛽𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑂  -0.449  -0.977 ***  -2.169 ***  -2.490 ***    0.657  -2.059 ***  -2.358 ***   NA 
𝛽𝑆𝑃𝑅   -1.430  -0.482 ***  -0.115 ***  -0.008    -0.627  -0.122 ***  -0.070 ***   NA 
𝛽Schwarz  -0.204  3.728 ***  -3.259 ***  -4.376 ***    -0.892  3.493 ***  -11.608 ***   NA 
                  
Adj-R2  0.82%  12.06%  27.06%  36.95%    1.05%  10.67%  31.05%  NA 
Per/Cross-sec  722/81  609/105  513/119  507/140    722/26  609/26  390/24  NA 
#Obs  41,646   45,175   50,419   54,385     13,721   12,359   5,007   NA 
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Figure I. Rolling 1 year correlation between sovereign bond portfolios and the stock market  
This figure presents the rolling 1 year correlation between sovereign bond portfolios and stock market portfolio for different 
groups of Euro-zone countries depending on risk.  Group bond/stock portfolio returns are obtained as an average of 
bond/stock portfolio returns belonging to the countries inside the group. Country-specific bond portfolio returns are 
estimated as return averages of all sovereign benchmark bonds of a country. Country-specific stock market returns are 
obtained from equity indices data for each Euro-zone country. Countries included are Germany (DE), the Netherlands (NL), 
Finland (FI), Italy (IT), Spain (ES), Portugal (PT), Ireland (IE), and Greece (GR). We employ daily observations. Sub-periods are 
01 Oct 2004 to 31 Jul 2007 for the pre-crisis (PRE), 01 Aug 2007 and 31 Dec 2009 for the subprime crisis (SUB), 01 Jan 2010 
to 30 Dec 2011 and 01 Jan 2012 to 31 Dec 2013 for the first (SOV I) and second (SOV II) part, respectively, of sovereign debt 
crisis. 
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Figure II. Individual country 5 year CDS spreads and average proportional bid-ask spreads. This figure 
shows the daily 5 year CDS spreads and proportional bid-ask spreads for each Eurozone country from Oct 2004 
to Dec 2013. All values are expressed in basis points. The vertical lines represent major global events. 
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Figure III. Univariate regressions of Excess Sovereign Bond Returns on Excess Stock Market 
Returns, Changes in 5 year CDS Spreads, and Changes in Bid-Ask Spreads 
This figure reports the statistically significant coefficients (at 10%) of the following panel regression model:  
𝑅𝐵𝑖,𝑐𝑟,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐵𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝛽𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑐𝑟,𝑡 
where 𝑅𝐵𝑖,𝑐𝑟,𝑡  represents the mid-price return at time 𝑡 of bond 𝑖 issued by country 𝑐𝑟, 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐵𝑡 represents the 3 month ECB 
yield, and 𝑋𝑡is equal to either the excess equity index return (𝐸𝑄𝑇𝑐𝑟,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐵𝑡; top figure), the change of the country 
specific 5 year CDS spread ( ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑐𝑟,𝑡 ; middle figure), or the change of the bond specific proportional bid-ask spread 
(∆𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑖,𝑐𝑟,𝑡 ; bottom figure). Corresponding adjusted-R2s are presented in the figures on the right. Countries included are 
Germany (DE), the Netherlands (NL), Finland (FI), Italy (IT), Spain (ES), Portugal (PT), Ireland (IE), and Greece (GR). We employ 
daily observations. For each sub-period, regressions variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% taking into account all time-
series observations demeaned at the bond level. Sub-periods are 01 Oct 2004 to 31 Jul 2007 for the pre-crisis, 01 Aug 2007 
and 31 Dec 2009 for the subprime crisis; the sovereign crisis is split into two parts, 01 Jan 2010 to 30 Dec 2011 and between 
01 Jan 2012 to 31 Dec 2013. White (1980) cross-section standard errors and covariance are used. 
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Figure IV. Conditional Equity Beta and Realised CAPM Beta 
This figure reports the rolling 1 year cross-country averages of realised CAPM betas (top figure), of betas estimated with an 
interacted 200 bp CDS dummy (middle figure), and of betas estimated with interacted macro-factors (bottom figure). 
Group bond/stock portfolio returns are obtained as an average of bond/stock portfolio returns belonging to the countries 
inside the group. Country-specific bond portfolio returns are estimated as return averages of all sovereign benchmark 
bonds of a country. Countries included are Germany (DE), the Netherlands (NL), Finland (FI), Italy (IT), Spain (ES), Portugal 
(PT), Ireland (IE), and Greece (GR).  The base rate is the 3 month AAA ECB yield. We employ daily observations. Sub-periods 
are 01 Oct 2004 to 31 Jul 2007 for the pre-crisis (PRE), 01 Aug 2007 and 31 Dec 2009 for the subprime crisis (SUB), 01 Jan 
2010 to 30 Dec 2011 and 01 Jan 2012 to 31 Dec 2013 for the first (SOV I) and second (SOV II) part, respectively, of the 
sovereign debt crisis. 
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Figure V. Rolling 1 year average of days when the country-specific 10 year bond yield is above the 
median  
These figures present the rolling 1 year average of days when the country-specific 10 year bond yield is above the Euro-zone 
median yield. The 10 year sovereign bond series are built using yield data from Bloomberg by considering each day the yield 
of the bond with the residual maturity closes to 10 years. The Lehman collapse on 15 Sep 2008 is signalled by the black 
vertical line. Euro-zone countries included are Germany (DE), the Netherlands (NL), Finland (FI), France (FR), Austria (AT), 
Belgium (BE), Italy (IT), Spain (ES), Portugal (PT), Ireland (IE), and Greece (GR). 
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Appendix A. Macro and financial variables employed to obtain time varying equity betas. 
 
Series Source Unit 
 
Quarterly 
Output Gap Estimated 
(Real GDP / Real GDP Quadratic 
Trend) - 1  
Real GDP Eurostat Chained 2010 Prices SWDA 
Debt/GDP Eurostat Ratio 
   
Monthly 
Retail Sales Eurostat Volume SA 
Unemployment Rate Eurostat Harmonized Rate SA 
CPI Eurostat Harmonized index, 2005=100 NSA 
Imports Eurostat Volume index, 2010=100 SWDA 
Exports Eurostat Volume index, 2010=100 SWDA 
Industry Production Eurostat Volume index, 2010=100 SWDA 
Money supply M3 Datastream Volume Billion Euro 
Economic Sentiment European Commission Index SA 
Rolling 5 year Correlation 
between Industrial Production 
Growth and Inflation 
Eurostat Percentage points 
   
Daily 
5 year CDS spread Bloomberg Basis Points 
Proportional Bid-Ask Spread MTS Time Series Basis Points 
Note: SA, NSA and SWDA refer to Seasonally Adjusted, Not Seasonally Adjusted and Seasonally and 
Working Day Adjusted series, respectively. 
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Appendix B. ECB Unconventional Policy Measures 
The following two tables present the dates for the Announcement and LTRO dummies  
 
Announcement dummy dates 
Date Description 
28/03/2008 2 supplementary 6 month LTROs. 
04/09/2008 Supplementary 6 month LTRO. 
07/10/2008 Increase in allotment amount of 6 month LTRO. 
09/10/2008 Fixed-rate full allotment (FRFA) procedure in the main refinancing operations (MROs). 
13/10/2008 Liquidity in U.S. dollars (currency swaps with the Fed) provided at FRFA procedure. 
15/10/2008 
5 supplementary 6 month LTROs. FRFA procedure in all longer-term refinancing 
operations (LTROs). 
05/03/2009 
ECB will continue with the current frequency and maturity profile of supplementary 
LTROs for as long as needed until the end of 2009. 
07/05/2009 
ECB announced it would purchase euro-denominated covered bonds issued in the 
euro area (CBPP1). 3 supplementary 1 year LTROs. 
03/12/2009 Supplementary 6-month LTRO. 
10/05/2010 
Supplementary 6-month LTRO. Reactivation of FRFA procedure in regular longer-term 
refinancing operations (LTROs). 
10/05/2010 ECB introduces Securities Markets Programme (SMP1). 
04/08/2011 Supplementary 6-month LTRO. 
08/08/2011 SMP second phase announced (SMP2). 
06/10/2011 
ECB announced the second covered bond purchase programme (CBPP2). 
Supplementary 12 month and 13 month LTRO. 
08/12/2011 ECB to conduct two 3 year LTRO with provisions of repayment after one year. 
26/07/2012 ECB President Mario Draghi speech ("whatever it takes to preserve the euro"). 
06/09/2012 ECB announced Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT).  
 
 
LTRO dummy dates 
Allotment Dates Maturity  Allotment Dates Maturity 
02/04/2008 6 Months  12/08/2009 6 Months 
09/07/2008 6 Months  09/09/2009 6 Months 
08/10/2008 6 Months  30/09/2009 1 Year 
12/11/2008 6 Months  07/10/2009 6 Months 
10/12/2008 6 Months  11/11/2009 6 Months 
07/01/2009 6 Months  09/12/2009 6 Months 
11/02/2009 6 Months  16/12/2009 1 Year 
11/03/2009 6 Months  31/03/2010 6 Months 
08/04/2009 6 Months  12/05/2010 6 Months 
13/05/2009 6 Months  10/08/2011 6 Months 
10/06/2009 6 Months  26/10/2011 1 Year 
24/06/2009 1 Year  21/12/2011 3 Years 
08/07/2009 6 Months  29/02/2012 3 Years 
 
